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Science aims at understanding phenomena. One natural candidate for illuminating scientific 
understanding is explanation. Certainly, an explanation could contribute to someone’s understanding. 
But it is controversial whether explanations must produce understanding, whether understanding 
always involves some explanation, and whether there can be understanding without explanation. In 
his book Understanding Scientific Understanding (2017, OUP), Henk de Regt sheds light on the relation 
between explanation and understanding by offering a unique account of scientific understanding, with 
an eye on how understanding is achieved. This account – which draws from two decades of his research 
– is presented in a form that is pleasant to read, accessible to a variety of readers, embedded into the 
longstanding philosophical debate about scientific explanations, and buttressed with numerous 
examples and three in-depth case studies from the history of physics. Although de Regt every so often 
points to examples from other sciences, such as biology, his account is tailored to physics. At best, he 
convinces his readers that it generalizes to other natural sciences. But whether it can accommodate 
social sciences or economics is not evident, as de Regt himself admits (pp. 11, 261).  
de Regt’s account follows an approach that considers the analysis of scientific practice to be the 
driving source of philosophical accounts of science (cf. ch. 1.2, 8.3). He aims at a rational reconstruction 
of scientists’ criteria for understanding, based on and evaluated by historical studies of physics. 
Although de Regt only mentions it in passing, his account of understanding is primarily concerned 
with understanding why or explanatory understanding (cf. fn. 1 on p. 2, p. 96). Other forms of 
understanding, such as understanding how or so-called objectual understanding are not tackled. Another 
constraint is that de Regt focuses on what he calls the macro level (science as a whole) and meso level 
(scientific communities) instead of the micro level (scientists) (p. 90). He aims at analyzing what it means 
for a scientific community, rather than a single subject, to achieve understanding. Moreover, he is not 
concerned with the phenomenology of understanding (pp. 20-23). According to de Regt, understanding 
why always involves some explanation why p; there is no understanding why without explanation. Yet, 
there could be explanations that do not provide understanding; these are explanations that lack an 
intelligibility feature (p. 92): 
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Criterion of Understanding Phenomena (CUP): A phenomenon P is understood scientifically if 
and only if there is an explanation of P that is based on an intelligible theory T and conforms to 
the basic epistemic values of empirical adequacy and internal consistency.   
In other words, a phenomenon is understood iff there is an explanation that is (i) based on an 
intelligible theory, (ii) empirically adequate, (iii) and internally consistent. According to de Regt, 
explanations are arguments in a broad sense (pp. 24-25) and he argues in favor of pluralism about 
explanations (chapter 3). de Regt does not say much about the last two constraints, but takes it to be 
rather self-evident that any understanding providing explanation features them, although perhaps to 
different extents (pp. 36-38, 93). His focus lies on the intelligibility criterion, which is intersubjectively 
defined (p. 40):  
Intelligibility: the value that scientists attribute to the cluster of qualities of a theory (in one or 
more of its representations) that facilitate the use of the theory. 
Intelligibility is what one could call a cluster concept, i.e., a concept whose application does not 
require that all characterizing features are fulfilled. According to de Regt, the prime qualities are 
visualizability, appeal to causes, and unification (p. 56). Other qualities are simplicity, continuity, etc. 
The main use of a theory (regarding understanding why) is the construction of explanatory models of 
the phenomena in question. de Regt also offers an instance of an intelligibility criterion (p. 102): 
Criterion for the Intelligibility of Theories (CIT1):  A scientific theory T (in one or more of its 
representations) is intelligible for scientists (in context C) if they can recognize the qualitatively 
characteristic consequences of T without performing exact calculations. 
Importantly, this is just one criterion. Theories can be intelligible in other ways. In fact, according 
to de Regt, intelligibility is not just a cluster concept; it is a concept whose characterizing features can 
vary across contexts and scientific communities (meso level). Intelligibility is a context-sensitive notion. 
For instance, whether visualizability is part of the cluster or not varies among communities. This 
renders understanding context-sensitive, too. de Regt underpins the context-sensitivity claim and CIT1 
with the aid of detailed case studies of research on gravity (ch. 5), the use of mechanical models in 
nineteenth-century physics (ch. 6), and the role of visualizability in quantum physics (ch. 7).  
de Regt’s proposal to provide a unified notion of understanding in terms of intelligibility is 
promising. It also seems to be plausible that intelligibility is a cluster concept that varies across 
scientific communities, diachronically and synchronically. In my opinion, however, de Regt’s account 
faces a couple of challenges. Some of these have been pointed out by Kareem Khalifa (2017), such as 
the issue that his notion of a theory (which allows for a collection of loosely circumscribed theoretical 
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principles) and his notion of being based on a theory (which allows for a theory to just play some 
constraining role) are arguably too broad (pp. 97-98). I focus on additional issues.  
First, the object of analysis needs to be better specified. He seems to conflate the question of what 
is required for acquiring understanding and the question of what understanding consists in: “But what 
does it mean to seek or to achieve such understanding? What exactly is scientific understanding? This 
is the question that this book aspires to answer” (p. 2, my italics). de Regt mainly tackles acquisition 
and CUP only provides (allegedly) necessary and together sufficient criteria for understanding (p. 95). 
At best, his rough characterization of understanding phenomena (UP) gestures towards an answer to 
the constitution question: “UP […] = having an adequate explanation of the phenomena” (p. 23). Yet, 
de Regt remains silent on what having explanations involves, at the micro, meso, or macro level. 
Second, CUP does not seem to provide a sufficient criterion. The existence of an explanation might 
well be crucial for acquiring understanding, but it does not seem sufficient. As de Regt emphasizes, 
understanding is a ‘three-term relation’ (p. 19) between a phenomenon, an explanation, and a subject 
(be it an individual or subjects in a community). So, understanding must involve some subjects that 
take an epistemic stance toward the explanation. If de Regt wants to claim that the construction of an 
appropriate explanation already suffices for understanding, he needs to argue for it. 
Third, and relatedly, CUP does not incorporate de Regt’s claim that understanding requires epistemic 
accessibility (p. 84). Perhaps de Regt would like to maintain that someone must craft the understanding 
providing explanation. But then the question arises whether access for a single individual would be 
enough or whether the number of scientists depends on the group size, e.g., mainstream physicists vs. 
a group of pioneering physicists.  
Fourth, de Regt claims that understanding can come in degrees (pp. 43, 135). However, he does 
not outline how his account could accommodate this claim. In their current forms, neither CUP nor 
the intelligibility characterization can accommodate degrees. Intelligibility might be analyzed as coming 
in degrees, but it is not clear whether degrees of understanding (if existent) are measurable in terms of 
intelligibility. It seems more natural to assume that the content of the understanding providing 
explanation is crucial; a richer explanation might lead to more understanding, etc. 
Fifth, de Regt proposes a relationship between explanation and understanding that seems to 
contradict CUP. He claims that understanding a phenomenon is the product of explanations (e.g., pp. 
45, 86, 96). However, if understanding is the product of explanations, there is no explanation without 
understanding. Yet, according to CUP, only explanations that fulfill the conditions (i)-(iii) can provide 
understanding. Perhaps de Regt endorses the weaker claim that understanding is a potential product 
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of explanations. He sometimes states that understanding is the goal (e.g., pp. 12, 25, 45), which would 
be compatible with a weaker claim. But if so, he should be clearer on this crucial claim.   
Sixth, de Regt sells CIT1 as a sufficient condition (cf. footnote 15 on p. 102). So, contra what he 
suggests elsewhere (pp. 101, 271), CIT1 cannot be a test for whether or not a theory is intelligible, since 
it is not a necessary condition. More importantly, CIT1 seems to describe a manifestation of, rather than a 
condition for, intelligibility. A recognition of a theory’s consequences seems to be a manifestation of the 
facilitation of the use of that theory. Moreover, CIT1 commits de Regt to claiming that citing a correlation 
can provide understanding (p. 122). If CIT1 were just about manifestation, he need not to commit to 
such a controversial claim.  
So, there seems to be need for further development of de Regt’s account. Yet, it is undoubtedly 
an important contribution to the field. It involves many valuable insights, promising theses, and 
excellently crafted in-depth case studies.  
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